Though strictly forbidden by the South Korean Land Reform Act (1950), the resale of lands distributed by that land reform was widespread. In Namjong-myeon, 38.3 percent of the original recipient households (the so-called subae nongga, those households that originally received land under the land reform) resold their distributed lands in de facto land sales. As a result of such sales, while the original recipient households in Namjongmyeon had numbered 371, the actual number of final recipient households-those who ultimately gained possession of the distributed lands-increased to 393. Among these 371 subae nongga households, 77 abandoned their distributed lands. Those who did so were economically disadvantaged relative to their peers in both the size of their landholdings as well as land distributions. Yet, despite the widespread de facto buying and selling of land at the time of the land reform, ultimately there was little difference between the "original recipients" and "final recipients" of distributed land in terms of land size and ownership. This means that the "equalitarianism" of the South Korean land reform, which is regarded as one of the key factors behind the successful growth of the South Korean economy, was steadfastly maintained even through the turmoil of the Korean War.
in 1950. Once enforced, South Korea's land reform legislation was carried out through the turmoil of the Korean War and up into the 1990s, forming the backbone of South Korea's state policy on agricultural land until it was formally dissolved in 1995 by the new legislation on agricultural land of 1994.
1 The basic principle behind the South Korean land reform was a ceiling on ownership of land, which was capped at three jeongbo. Equality was favored over efficiency.
In this article, I would like to call the aforementioned basic principle the "scope of the land reform." Despite numerous claims that this "scope of the land reform" obstructed the efficient development of national agriculture, the principle was upheld in South Korea into the mid-1990s. Indeed, such equalitarianism had a deep influence over South Korean society. In reality, however, South Korea's land reform policy would have been unlikely were it not for the particular context of sudden liberation from colonial rule. With its ideological origins in traditional notions of good rulership, the idea of "land-tothe-tillers" became the dominant discourse in the context of national liberation-a time when socialism was widely popular (Jo 2001a) .
Once the land reform began, the people of South Korea, particularly farmers, witnessed the realization of equalitarianism for the first time in Korean history. This "imposition" of equalitarianism through land reform became a factor that fundamentally shaped South Korean society at large. That particular characteristic of South Korean society, where people readily abide by a state policy of extracting economic surpluses for the goal of rapid industrialization while holding onto a strong desire for political democratization, cannot be effectively explained without reference to the accomplishments of land reform that instilled equalitarianism throughout South Korean society.
However, very few studies have viewed the South Korean land reform as an "installation" of equalitarianism. Landmark studies on the subject of land reform include those by Jang Sanghwan (1984; and Kim Seongho et al. (1989) . More recent works, responding to the above-mentioned studies, have 1. While the land reform bill set forth the method for dividing the land in South Korea, it did not specify how those newly divided lands would be operated and maintained. The South Korean government, on numerous occasions, attempted to legislate basic laws on how the divided lands would be owned, transferred, and maintained, but largely failed in its efforts. The South Korean government partially addressed these issues through such laws as the "Maintenance and Usage of Farmland Act" (Law no. 2373 , December 18, 1972 and the "Farmland Lend-Lease Management Act" (Law no. 3888, December 31, 1986) . A holistic legislation on farmland did not come until 1994, when the South Korean government legislated the "Farmland Act" (Law no. 4817, December 22, 1994) . For discussions of such legislation, see Jo Seokgon (Cho Seok Gon) and Hwang Sucheol (2004) and Jo Seokgon (2009b) .
focused on analyzing the positive influences the land reform had on the development of South Korean capitalism (Kim 2000; Jang 2000; Hong, ed. 2001) . These works have acknowledged the "contribution" South Korean land reform had to the country's capitalist development. These works are also in line with the argument that the land reform eventually allowed for the effective extraction of rural surpluses for use towards industrialization (Kay 2002) . However, these studies did not touch upon the structure of South Korean agriculture: the relationship between the system of small and independent farmers and capitalist development. Further, these works ignore the fact that the system had inherent limitations in that most of the farming households' land holdings were too small to achieve economic stability in management and did not cater to the stipulated goal of capitalistic development. On the other hand, although quite a few works of research have touched on the problem of the landed farmer system, 2 particularly the question of stability in agricultural management for farm households that received their lands through the land reform ("subae nongga"), 3 such works do not discuss the relationship between such instability and the development of capitalism in South Korea.
The fact that the basic logic of equalitarianism in South Korean land reform was maintained throughout the period of rapid economic growth is something to be considered, and is related to the classic debate on the relationship between unequal distribution and economic growth. 4 Arguments that the currently intensifying social and economic "polarization" in South Korea is damaging to economic development, despite the social atmosphere that prioritizes efficiency, are being raised in the same context. For those studies focusing on the case of South Korea, a number of them have argued that the asset market's relative equality is one of the factors behind South Korea's rapid economic growth (You 1998 , Jeong et al. 2005 . Though such equality is a product of the South Korean land reform, these works have not seriously touched upon that land reform and do not pay attention to the aforementioned "installation" of equalitarianism in South Korean society.
This article represents one of the first steps in discussing the notion of the "installation" of equalitarianism through land reform in South Korea. In so doing, it focuses on the little-known fact that the list of households receiving land (subae nongga) changed over the course of the land reform. According to a South Korean government survey carried out in 1959, some 30 percent of the original households designated to receive land gave up their rights over the distributed lands. This means that some of the distributed lands were illegally sold by landowners on the original subae nongga to other peasants. These illegal but widespread sales of distributed land are termed de facto land sales in this article. Considering the fact that the selling of land marked for distribution was not permitted within the framework of the land reform bill, this is a high percentage indeed. Such massive change begs the following questions. Why did some tenant farmers, who were seen as the biggest beneficiaries of the land reform, give up their rights for distributed land? Did those farm households who received land possess different socioeconomic backgrounds than those that chose not to? More fundamentally, why did such selling and buying of land, which went against the fundamental principle of land reform, even take place?
This article aims to answer these questions by examining the significance of such change in the composition of households listed to receive distributed land from the state 5 and whether or not any qualitative differences in socioeconomic backgrounds existed for those who received the land from the state and those who chose not to. If the change in composition of households slated to receive land has a correspondence with socioeconomic status, such a fact would indicate that the equalitarianism of South Korean land reform was crippled from the start. On the other hand, if the original aim of the Land Reform Act was maintained even through the chaos of the Korean War, it would be safe to say that such logic, from the start became a fundamental aspect of the development of capitalism in South Korea.
A case study on the change in composition of the subae nongga is that of Jo 5. In this article, I term the households originally listed to receive land from the state as "original recipients" (won subae nongga) and the households that received and fully paid for the land as "final recipients" (choejong subae nongga). As will be discussed later, title transfer was not at first possible if such changes occurred in the list of households originally designated to receive the land.
To solve this problem, the state legislated the Special Act on the Title Transfer of Distributed Land (Law no. 613, May 25, 1961) . According to this act, these new households designated to receive land were termed "hyeongyeong jakja" ("those currently farming the land").While such a term may better describe conditions at the time, this article uses the term "final recipient" in order to avoid any confusion. Seokgon (2009a) . Based on the case of Hojeo-myeon, in Wonju city, the findings of that study cannot be extrapolated due to its small scope (only forty households chose to buy the land before the land reform). This article approaches the same topic but uses the case of Namjong-myeon in Gwangju city. Namjong-myeon is relatively rich in data related to the land reform, and the change in its subae nongga was also relatively pronounced. 6 The discussion will proceed as follows. The following section two will introduce the sources that will be used in this article, and provide an overview of the land selling that took place in Namjong-myeon prior to the land reform. Section three will present a detailed analysis of the changes in the subae nongga of Namjongmyeon. Lastly, section four will revisit the significance of such findings and will also discuss the limitations of this article as well as tasks for future research.
Condition of Distributed Lands in Namjong-myeon
The Land Ownership Structure in Namjong-myeon Immediately Prior to the Land Reform
Namjong-myeon, a part of Yangpyeong-gun during the late Joseon period, was made into a part of Gwangju-gun by the 1914 reform of administrative districts. In this process, it was also consolidated to include Bunwon-ri, Ucheonri, Gwiyeo-ri, Geomcheon-ri, and Sucheong-ri. 7 Namjong-myeon had more fields than paddies, and the fields grew more vegetables than cereal crops (Namjong-myeon, "Gwannae sanghwang" 管內狀況). According to the official cadastral survey carried out by the Japanese colonial state, four ri (villages) of Namjong-myeon collectively had 640.0 jeongbo of cultivated land. Fields made up 420.7 jeongbo 8 (65.7 percent) and paddies 219.3 jeongbo (34.3 percent). According to the survey carried out by the South Korean government at the end of 1953, immediately after the Korean War, the total area of cultivated land in Namjong-myeon was 650.4 jeongbo. Fields made up 374.3 jeongbo and paddies 276.1 jeongbo, a 6:4 ratio. While the area of cultivated land hardly increased at all throughout the colonial period, the fields decreased by around 45 jeongbo while the paddies increased by more than that amount. 6 . A narrative on the process of land reform in this area can be found in Jo Seokgon (2011) and will not be discussed in full detail in this article.
7. As Ucheon-ri has since been submerged under water due to the building of the Paldang Dam, only the remaining four ri will be discussed in this article. Only one Japanese individual owned land in Namjong-myeon at the time of the Japanese cadastral survey, and he only owned three plots (pilji) of land, 377 pyeong. 9 The Oriental Development Company (Dongyang Choeksik Jusikhoesa) did not own any land in Namjong-myeon. On the other hand, the disintegration of land ownership had progressed to a significant degree by 1914. By that time, out of 574 landowners, 222 (38.7 percent) were petty owners owning three danbo 10 or less of land. Collectively, their holdings comprised only 3.7 percent of all cultivated land. Meanwhile, forty-nine individuals owned more than three jeongbo of land, and their holdings made up 52.3 percent of the total land in Namjong-myeon.
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Such conditions had not changed much by the time of the South Korean land reform. The confiscated land in Namjong-myeon totaled nine plots, and four Japanese landlords had owned 4,340 pyeong of land before liberation. The total number of landowners in 1953 was 1,225, twice as many as at the beginning of Japanese rule. Landlords who lived outside of Namjong-myeon numbered 240, meaning 80 percent of landowners in Namjong-myeon resided in Namjong-myeon. Considering the fact that the total number of households in Namjong-myeon was 640 (492 of them were farming households), the number of those owning land in Namjong-myeon was notably high (Namjong-myeon, "Gwannae sanghwang"). Even considering the 240 absentee landlords, the information in land registers suggests the possibility of overestimating the "pettiness" of land ownership in Namjong-myeon.
Looking at the disintegration of land ownership, in 1953, 630 landowners (51.4 percent of the total landowners) with less than three danbo of land owned 12 percent of all cultivated land in Namjong-myeon. On the other hand, twenty-six landowners (2.1 percent) with more than three jeongbo of land owned 23.6 percent of all cultivated land. While the former category of smaller farmers increased their number and total share of land, the latter category of larger landlords decreased their number as well as their concomitant share.
Compared to the early days of Japanese rule, inequality in landownership in Namjong-myeon following the Korean War actually decreased. The Gini coefficient in Namjong-myeon, calculated using the land registers, decreased from 0.6981 in the 1910s to 0.6134 at the end of 1953.
12 Such change reflected 12. The Gini coefficient, a number between 0 and 1 that is a measure of inequality, here is calculated by using registered data on land ownership that does not include tenant households not owning land. The true coefficient must have been much higher.
the downward distribution that decreased the number of large landowners while at the same time increasing the number of small landowners. Due to the physical loss of land registers during the Korean War, it is not easy to discern when the proportions of large landowners started to decrease. 13 We can, however, speculate that a substantial amount of land was sold before the South Korean land reform actually took place.
The Land Reform and Realities of De Facto Land Sales in Namjong-myeon
The South Korean land reform was carried out in the following order: identification of land to be divided and distributed, payment for land by the new landowner and compensation to the former landlord, and title transfer. The case of Namjong-myeon did not differ much from this pattern. The South Korean government had already carried out a land survey and came up with a national list of tillers and their cultivated lands by early 1950. In Namjongmyeon, this job was completed before the outbreak of the Korean War (Jo 2011). While redemptions continued throughout the period of the Korean War, distribution of compensations to landlords was greatly delayed. A list of landlords and their land holdings was only completed in 1952 in Namjongmyeon, and even that was not an exhaustive list. The landlords also did not actively seek compensation-nationwide, around half of the landlords had not even applied for compensation by the middle of 1953. On the other hand, the redemption rate was relatively high in Namjong-myeon. By 1954, the national redemption rate was 72.8 percent, while the rate for Namjong-myeon was 81.8 percent. That rate for Namjong-myeon rose even further to 96.8 percent by the end of 1959. Namjong-myeon's landlord compensation rate was also a notch above the national average by 1958 (Jo 2011).
Even with the completion of payments for land, the titles had to be transferred before the land reform could be called complete. The most difficult problem for the South Korean government by the late 1950s in completing the land reform was that the title transfer was not possible in many cases due to the fact that the tillers of many plots were not the original recipients of the distributed land. This problem started to appear by mid-1955, and the state was 13. Because of the above mentioned destruction of records, only post-1953 data is available. This is the reason why I have calculated the land holdings using data from late 1953. Because title transfers hardly took place until the end of 1953, this loss of data does not present too much of a problem.
aware that legislative measures had to be taken to address it. The government's order of May 1960 to compile a list of distributed land was an effort to solve the aforementioned problem and to complete the land reform by compiling its basic statistics. While the state recorded changes in land distribution through the process of land reform, an overwhelming accumulation of changes necessitated the compilation of an entirely new land record. A new record on distributed land, the "Bunbae nongjibu" ("list of distributed land") was therefore compiled based on the data as of April 30, 1960. In May 1961, around the time the new record on land distribution was being completed, the South Korean government promulgated the "Special Act on Title Transfer of Distributed Land" (Law no. 613, May 25, 1961) . Through this legislation, de facto owners of land, who were not the original recipients of the land from the state but met the guidelines set forth by the land reform law, could now obtain titles to that land in their own names.
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The de facto selling of land at the time of the land reform was a widespread phenomenon. To investigate this, in 1959 the South Korean government carried out a national survey.
15 According to Table 1 , only some 420,000 (27.7 percent)
14. While this law was originally limited to two years from the date of enactment, two additional legislations extended it to June 30, 1965.
15. The South Korean government's move aimed to devise ways to transfer titles to those households who actually purchased the land from the "original recipient" prior to the completion of their redemptions (Nongji gaehyeoksa gwangye jaryojip, 3, 92). The data is based on July 31, 1959. households completed both a land redemption and title transfer. While those who paid the state in full for their land numbered some 920,000 households (60.7 percent), only 45.7 percent of them completed the title transfer. In the case of Gyeonggi-do, among those who paid for their land, the percentage who also obtained the title transfer was even lower. Only 17,661 (9.3 percent) out of 190,369 households completed both payment and title transfer. Only around 13.7 percent of those who had completed the land redemption actually received their titles. Considering the fact that the number of farmers who paid the state for their land grant was higher in Gyeonggi-do (67.5 percent), the ratio of title transfer there can be seen as significantly lower vis-à-vis other part of the country.
One reason why the proportion of title transfers was lower in Gyeonggido is because more land was sold there in de facto sales at the time of the land reform than was done in the rest of the country. In Gyeonggi-do, de facto land sales before the land reform were at a rate of 37 percent of total distributed land plots, much higher than the national average of 29.8 percent. Gyeonggi-do's rate was triple that of Chungcheongbuk-do, the province with the lowest rate of de facto land sales in the country. Gyeonggi-do's rate was also double that of the Yeongnam region (Gyeongsangbuk-do and Gyeongsangnamdo).
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Percentages also varied within provinces. According to an October 1958 survey of seven counties in Gyeongsangnam-do, Chungcheongnam-do, and Jeollanam-do, the rate in Cheonan in Chungcheongnam-do was 22 percent. 16 . Examining national trends, Gyeonggi-do was second only to Jeollabuk-do in terms of de facto land sales. The relatively high rates found in Jeollabuk-do and Jeollanam-do, two provinces that collectively contained 40 percent of the land to be redistributed, helped push up the national average to 29.8 percent.
Province
Total distributed land (in plots) Jeong-eup in Jeollanam-do reported a rate of nearly 60 percent. On the other hand, Iksan in Jeollabuk-do was at 32 percent, and Dangjin in Chungcheongnamdo was 50 percent. Percentages could also vary within counties. The average rate for de facto land sales in Gwangju-gun was 50.6 percent. Within that county, however, de facto land sale rates varied from Chowol-myeon's 19.4 percent to Eonjumyeon's 78.5 percent. Namjong-myeon, at 36.3 percent, was generally lower than the county average. Out of 372 households targeted for land reform in Namjong-myeon, seventy-five (or 20.2 percent) sold their lands prior to the completion of their redemption. In terms of the aforementioned de facto land sale rate, Namjong-myeon had the third highest in Gwangju-gun.
Distributed Land in Namjong-myeon
Let us now turn to the data on land reform in Namjong-myeon. Changes in land distribution at the time of the land reform were recorded by the state. While information in the "Bunbae nongjibu" was generally used in this article, some modifications to this data were made from information found in the Source: "Bunbae nongji deunggi gwangye seoryu" (1962) "Sanghwan daejang" (payment registers) or the "Toji daejang" (land registers). After these modifications, the total distributed lands in Namjong-myeon came to 888 plots (pilji).
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Let us examine to what extent the data of the "Sujeong bunbae nongjibu" differs from the official statistics for Namjong-myeon. Table 3 shows the statistics submitted by Namjong-myeon to Gwangju-gun based on records as of the end of June 1961. A total of 372 households received land, the total amount of land was 125.1 jeongbo, and 3,599 seok was returned for redemption. If one excludes Ucheon-ri, a total of 365 households received land, the total amount of land was 112.7 jeongbo, and 3,384 seok was made in compensation. This data was submitted to Gwangju-gun from Namjong-myeon after the distribution record was produced, so this record is the most appropriate to compare against the "Sujeong bunbae nongjibu."
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On the other hand, the data from the "Sujeong bunbae nongjibu" is listed in Table 4 . While the number of households is smaller than in Table 3 , the 17. The "Sujeong bunpae nongjibu" was compiled by surveying the basic information on the distributed land through a comparison of data in the land registers ("Toji daejang") and the list of land to be distributed, as well as by reading compensation papers and other related documents on land distribution. All modifications to the records were undertaken by such procedures.
18. However, this data does not match exactly with that on the previous list for distribution. The original record reports 961 plots (pilji) of land, 386 households, 125.7 jeongbo of surface, and 4,046 seok of redemption. Redemption, in particular, differed by 1,853 seok of rice. While it is difficult to know the exact reason behind such discrepancies, at least the number of households designated to receive land appears to be unreliable. The number of households designated to receive land is identical to the number surveyed at the end of 1952. Considering the widespread changes that took place in the interim, this number is probably inaccurate. Source: "Bosang gwangye seoryu" (1961) amounts of distributed land and redemption were larger. 19 The land area was assessed to be 4.6 jeongbo more (excluding Ucheon-ri, for which no information is available in the "Sujeong bunbae nongjibu"), and most of the increases came from fields. On the other hand, redemptions were larger in the paddies. The differences, however, were not significant. Compared to the difference between redemptions, the difference in land size measurements did not amount to much.
Let us now take a look at the changes in households listed to receive land relative to what we have seen in Table 2 . The differences between the two sources are outlined in Table 5 . 20 The households who held onto the originally-19. The reason for the large variation between Bunweon-ri and Ucheon-ri is that Table 4 is based on the specific localities of farmers while Table 3 is based on the locations of specific lands.
20. In order trace changes in land ownership, the "Sujeong bunbae nongjibu" recorded three types of tenants: (1) tenants according to the original list for land distribution; (2) tenants according to the list of tillers or tenants of the list of landlords or registers for payment; and (3) tenants listed on payment registers ("Sanghwan daejang"). The second and third categories of tenants were listed only if they differed from those in the first category. Chronologically, the changes occurred in the sequence of (2), (1), and (3). Lands with just the second category are lands without any change in recipients; the remaining are lands that were sold at the time of the land reform. From this point, the first households listed to receive lands will be termed the "original recipients," and the households in the final category will be called "final recipients." The reason why the number of households in Table 4 differs from Table 5 is because the households in Table 4 represent the second category, while the households in Table 5 represent the "original recipients" of land. Source: "Sujeong bunbae nongjibu" distributed land to the end numbered 229. The "All" category describes those who do not own all of the land they originally received via the distribution. This category is divided into two sub-categories. "Abandoned" refers to those households that abandoned their distributed land and did not receive any additional land from the state, and "Replaced" refers to those that abandoned the originally distributed land but ended up receiving different plots of land. Those whose lands have changed in Table 2 "All" are in the same category as "Abandoned" in Table 5 . Comparing the two according to these measures, the differences do not amount to be much despite the slightly higher rate of change reflected in the "Sujeong bunbae nongjibu." A comparison of the two sets of data reveals that the differences between the two are not significant. Therefore, I posit that the usage of the "Sujeong bunbae nongjibu" does not impede one from surveying the realities of land reform in Namjong-myeon. According to the "Sujeong bunbae nongjibu," the "final recipients" of land numbered 393 households while the "original recipients" numbered 371-a 5.9 percent increase. Out of the total of 888 plots (pilji), there were 248 plots that experienced change in ownership (27.9 percent). Table 5 shows the above-mentioned data organized according to households. Out of a total of 371 households, 142 households (38.3 percent) experienced changes in the lands they received, while 77 households (20.8 percent) ended up receiving no land after the aforementioned changes. At least in the case of Namjong-myeon, around 30 percent of plots and around 40 percent in terms of the number of households experienced land sales at the time of the land reform. Table 2 Economic Status of Recipient Households According to Size of Land Holdings
The Impact of Land Reform on Land Ownership
Let us first examine the proportion of distributed land vis-à-vis the total area of cultivated land in Namjong-myeon. Table 6 shows the total land area under cultivation according to the land registers as of the end of 1960. The reason why 1960 was selected here is because it was at this time that the South Korean government began compiling a final survey of land distribution to complete the land reform. In Namjong-myeon, the total area of distributed land comprised around 20 percent of the total area under cultivation. Compared to the national rate of around 25 percent, the proportion of distributed land was relatively low in Namjong-myeon. Now let us examine the inequality of land ownership in the wake of the land reform in Namjong-myeon. According to the calculated Gini coefficient, the Namjong-myeon's inequality in distribution of land ownership stabilized around 1953 at 0.6134, and then began to drop substantially from 1957, when it reached 0.6120. The Gini coefficient reached 0.5976 by 1961, and dropped even further-to 0.5767 in 1962 and 0.5622 in 1963. The continuous drop around this period is related to the Special Act on the Title Transfer of Distributed Land (enacted in 1961), which stimulated title transfers. The reason why the Gini coefficient continues to drop until 1966 and the land ownership appears to become more "equal" over time is because the buying and selling of land were strictly regulated during the land reform and with the special act on title transfer, more and more tenants who had completed their obligated payments received titles to their lands. Land registers obviously reflected such changes.
After reaching a record-low of 0.5505 in 1966, however, the trend reversed. One of the reasons why the Gini coefficient went up in 1968 and 1969 is because the Korea Electric Power Corporation bought vast plots of land in the area. The degree of inequality, however, continued to rise even after the period of land purchase by the Korea Electric Power Corporation. In the case of Namjong-myeon, we can assume, inequality in land ownership intensified after 1966.
Let us now compare the case of Namjong-myeon to other regions. Yecheongun's Yongmun-myeon, for example, displays similar trends as those of Namjong-myeon. After a period of stabilization from 1965 to 1969, inequality in land ownership quickly rose again from 1970 (Jo 2001). For Wonju city's Hojeo-myeon, the turning point was 1964 (Jo 2005a). In Juksan-myeon in Gimje, after a radical increase through land reform, the degree of inequality remained steady into the 1970s. However, the case of Juksan-myeon may be more reflective of the nature of paddy-land area agriculture that encourages middle-class equalization in farming. 8 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
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Source: "Toji daejang" Chart 1. Changes in Namjong-myeon's Gini Coefficient
Changes in Land Recipient Households in Namjong-myeon and Sizes of Their Land Holdings
Let us take a look at changes in land ownership. According to Table 7 , the total number of "original recipient" households was 371 and the total number of "final recipient" households was 393, reflecting an increase of around 6 percent. As for the area of land under cultivation, the number of "final recipients" who received more than one jeongbo of farmland decreased vis-à-vis the "original recipients." Categorizing them in terms of area of land under cultivation, the largest group was comprised of those who received 0.5 to 1 jeongbo of land. Of this group, "original recipients" held 40.8 jeongbo (34.8 percent) of the land while "final recipients" held 43.7 jeongbo (37.3 percent).
Because of the increase in the number of households who received the land, the average size per household decreased. However, the degree of change can be considered minimal-there was simply not much change between "original recipients" and "final recipients" in the case of Namjong-myeon. However, the 77 households who were originally listed to receive land but were left out of the final list had a different characteristic vis-à-vis other households that were originally listed to receive land. According to Table 8 , the average area of land for households who gave up their land was 0.23 jeongbo, while for other households it was 0.33 jeongbo. 21 As for the percentage of farmers not owning land, households who gave up their land comprised 64.9 percent while other households made up 47.3 percent. Of all households who 21. A two-group t-test significance probability on the size of possessed land was 0.019 (supposed heteroscedasticity). It is difficult to say if there was a statistically significant difference in terms of land ownership. had received land, the ratio of those without land was about 50.1 percent. For households that gave up their lands, however, the ratio was higher than 60 percent.
As for the average area of land received, for households who gave up their land this was 0.26 jeongbo while for those that retained it it was 0.33 jeongbo-a statistically significant difference.
22 While the percentage of those who received less than three danbo of land for households who retained it was at 56.8 percent, among those who gave up the land it reached 67.5 percent. Those households that gave up their land rights were generally more disadvantaged than those who retained them in terms of both the area of land possession prior to the land reform and the size of their distributed land. Such factors help explain why they decided to abandon their distributed land.
Let us now turn to the issue of whether or not farmers' economic status at the time of the land reform influenced the area of land distribution by 22. T-test significance probability on the size of received land was 0.004 (supposed heteroscedasticity). Source: "Toji daejang"; "Sujeong bunbae nongjibu" * The top box in each category represents the number of households, and the bottom box represents the total size of land under cultivation comparing the "original recipients" and "final recipients" of land. After hypothetically presuming that tenants during the Japanese colonial period received the land that they were tilling, Table 9 reflects the categories of tiller organized in terms of land ownership and whether one was a recipient of distributed land.
23 Table 10 organizes "original recipient" and "final recipient" households according to the categories established above. Type I represents farmers who 23. Of course, it was not a case of only the tenants of a particular land receiving that land from the state. In this sense, the diagram of Table 9 is theoretical. I believe, however, that generalizations can be made from this. own land and were not listed to receive land through the land reform. Type II represents those who had land as of 1953 and received land through the land reform. Type III represents tenants who did not own land and received land through the land reform. They can also be categorized as "independent farmers," "landed and tenant farmers," and "tenant farmers," respectively. Among the "original recipient" farmers of 371 households (Type II and Type III combined), those who did not own any land at the time of land reform numbered 189 households (50.9 percent). The total size of land they received through distribution was 57.7 jeongbo (49.2 percent). On the other hand, among the "final recipient" farmers of 393 households, those who did not own any land at the time of the land reform numbered 209 households (53.2 percent) and the size of their distributed land was also larger at 61.2 jeongbo (52.2 percent).While the changes in land distribution favored those without any land to begin with, the degree of such change was minimal.
Next, I want to examine the changes in area of land possession by comparing the data from 1953 with that from 1967. 24 As for Type I, those who were not involved with distributed land at the time of the land reform, the area of their lands radically decreased. This is because some of the distributed land came from their holdings. However, those who owned some land at the time of the land reform (Type II), saw their holdings decrease despite the fact that they gained additional land through the land reform. On the other hand, Type III households substantially increased their landholdings-44.3 jeongbo over the same period.
25 Such trends can also be detected in the final list for land distribution.
26
As for the "original recipient" households, the percentage of "landed-andtenant farmers" went up by 5.7 percent through the land reform, while the 24. The reason I selected 1967 here is because starting in 1968 the Korea Electric Power Corporation's purchase of vast tracts of land in the region skewed the data.
25. At a glance, it appears strange that Type II households, despite receiving 59.6 jeongbo of land in addition to what they already owned (97.4 jeongbo), actually saw their land holdings dwindle. Type III households' average holdings, on paper, were also smaller than the land they receive through the land reform. Such seemingly odd phenomena had to do with the fact that many land exchanges have not yet been listed in the land registers.
26. Because the annual data from 1953 and 1967 are different, it is difficult to draw significant conclusions from Table 10 . We must also consider the fact that changes in land ownership were not readily recorded in the registers. Even when the payments were completed, land registers did not record the fact without the title transfers. Furthermore, there is the possibility that holdings may have decreased for the recipient households due to the inheritance or division of property over the fifteen-year interval. However, if such changes occurred across all of farm household types at the same proportionate rate, what best reveals changes in land ownership are not the absolute changes but the relative ones.
percentage of "tenant farmers" went up by 10.1 percent. For the "final recipient" households, the percentages went up by 5.1 and 11.0, respectively. Such increases, of course, resulted in decreases in the area of land owned by independent farmers. In the end, purely tenant farmers benefitted more than landed-and-tenant farmers in increasing their holdings. Such a trend can be observed among both "original recipients" and "final recipients."
Looking at landholding sizes per household, Type II households lost land, from an average of 0.63 jeongbo in 1953 to 0.54 jeongbo in 1967. Type III households, those who had no land holdings to start with, gained by an average of 0.23 jeongbo of land. According to the data for "final recipients," Type II households lost holdings from 0.65 jeongbo in 1953 to 0.54 jeongbo in 1967, while Type III households displayed no difference by gaining 0.23 jeongbo of land. Looking at all the data collected from Namjong-myeon, it appears that the changes in land recipients worked to favor pure tenants more than others in terms of increasing landholdings, but such differences were not enough to overturn the disparities that existed before the land reform.
Developments in Namjong-myeon differ from those of Hojeo-myeon (Jo 2009a), which saw farmers with larger landholdings reaping the greater share of distributed land. While the smaller size of Hojeo-myeon (around forty households) makes the case difficult to analyze in general terms, in Hojeomyeon the farmers with lands of their own did proactively collect rights to the distributed land and expand their land holdings. By contrast, in Namjongmyeon, it is difficult to say any one group was in a more advantageous position than others in terms of expanding their land holdings through the land reform.
Finally, let us take a look at the land holdings of the so-called "opinion leaders" of Namjong-myeon-village foremen, township foremen, heads of land reform committees, etc.
27 Because they had a certain degree of influence in the process of land reform in Namjong-myeon, it is possible they could have used such influence to increase their own land holdings.
It would appear, however, that they did not use their influence to such an end. According to Table 11 , more than 30 percent of them did not own land despite their status in the local communities. In fact, their land holdings actually decreased over time. Some 80 percent of them owned less than 1 jeongbo of land, and the average size of cultivated land was 0.58 jeongbo in 1953 and 0.46 27. The list of village and township foremen was obtained from the official records of Namjongmyeon. There were 5 township foremen, 11 heads of land reform committee, 20 township councilmen, and 14 village foremen. 6 out of 11 heads of land reform committee as well as 5 out of 20 township councilmen also had experience as village foremen. One of 5 township foremen had experience as a township councilman. jeongbo in 1967-little different from the average Namjong-myeon rates of 0.56 for 1953 and 0.44 for 1967.
On the other hand, the size of land they received through the land reform increased from 10,718 pyeong to 14,709 pyeong, representing more than 1 jeongbo of increase. The reason behind the increase has to do with the fact that two more households were added. While the average size of land received by "original recipients" in Namjong-myeon was 0.32 jeongbo, the same for the local leaders was 0.30 jeongbo. The average numbers change a bit for "final recipients," as the average for Namjong-myeon was 0.30 jeongbo while local leaders of Namjong-myeon received 0.35 jeongbo. While some benefitted from the process of prior selling of land, this was less than 1 jeongbo in total.
To summarize, the proportions of landholdings of independent farmers and landed-tenants among the "original recipients" were about the same at the time of land reform. About 20.8 percent among the "original recipients" later abandoned their distributed land, and they were economically disadvantaged relative to other households that had received land, in terms of both existing Source: "Toji daejang"; "Sujeong bunbae nongjibu" land holdings and distributed lands. For those who replaced these "abandoned" households in receiving land, however, there was no statistically significant difference between pure tenants and tenants with some land. Furthermore, local leaders who were involved in the administrative process of the land reform did not necessarily benefit from their positions. All observations reveal that there was little variation between the economic status of "original recipients" and that of the "final recipients."
Conclusion
Thus far, we have looked at the changes in those households who received land through the process of land reform in Namjong-myeon. As a result of the land reform, the degree of inequality in land ownership in Namjong-myeon was greatly reduced. Furthermore, such trends continued into the 1960s. The "original recipient" households in Namjong-myeon numbered 371, while the number of "final recipient" households increased to 393 households. Among the 371 "original recipients," 77 households abandoned their distributed lands. Those who abandoned their distributed lands were economically disadvantaged relative to their peers in both their landholdings as well as land distributions. However, "original recipients" and "final recipients" did not differ much in terms of their socioeconomic backgrounds. Now, based on the data that we have discussed thus far, let us try to answer the questions posed in the introduction. Among the land to be divided up and distributed in Namjong-myeon, some 30 percent of it was "illegally" sold off in de facto land sales at the time of the land reform. Some 40 percent of recipient households were involved in this. For those who were involved in the de facto buying and selling of land, around half gave up their distributed land. Households that refused to accept the distributed land were often economically disadvantaged relative to their peers who chose to maintain their distributed landholdings, and the size of distributed lands they were to receive also tended to be smaller. While relocations in farming may have been one factor for the land abandonment by households, their economic conditions that made even the repayment for the land distribution difficult, most likely played a role in their refusing to accept the distributed lands.
Despite the widespread de facto selling and buying of land at the time of the land reform, however, there was little difference between "original recipients" and "final recipients" in terms of distributed land size as well as prior ownership of land. Looking at the 1953 data, there was almost no difference except a slightly greater ratio of pure tenants among the "final recipients." The 1967 data also showed little difference between the two categories. Such results show that there were no hierarchical differences in de facto land selling at the time of the land reform.
Namjong-myeon was heavily affected by the Korean War. It was one of the locations selected by the U.S. military for landing troops, and it was also used by Chinese forces as a bivouac site. The United Nations forces used Namjongmyeon as a temporary airfield and the myeon office was destroyed during the course of the war. The fact that hierarchical differences cannot be found here, despite the effects of the war, shows that "the scope of land reform" was not affected by the de facto selling of land. The fact that the socioeconomic makeup of the land's "final recipients" differs little relative to that of the "original recipients" is the strongest proof of this.
The above-mentioned results suggest an important implication on the growth and development of capitalism in South Korea-the "equalitarianism" of the South Korean land reform was steadfastly maintained even through the turmoil of the Korean War. Up until the mid-1960s the various land reform legislations provided a powerful bulwark against inequality in land ownership. South Korean Farmers, having experienced "equalitarianism" through the land reform, invested profits gathered from agriculture in human resources (for example, in their children's education) while seeking "conservative stability" in hopes of improving the statuses of the succeeding generation. This aspect corresponds to the research that has collectively argued that equalitarianism in property assets positively contributed to economic growth (Deinginger and Squire 1998 , You 1998 , Jeong et al. 2005 . The land reform also facilitated the relocation of agricultural surpluses to non-agricultural fields of the economy (Kay 2002) , and this relocation would not have been possible without the "installation" of "equalitarianism" in South Korean society. The spontaneous outflow of agricultural surpluses to non-agricultural sectors of the economy on the part of the vast majority of the population, was one of the key factors behind the successful growth of the South Korean economy as well as the notable absence of social conflict during this period of growth.
Of course, the "scope" of the equalitarianism established by the land reform was limited. While changes in the recipients of the land distribution in Namjong-myeon, in terms of expansion of land holdings, better served the pure tenants than those owning the land, the difference was not enough to overturn existing differences between those who owned land and those who did not. Many economically disadvantaged farmers had no choice but to "give up" the plots they might have received through the land reform. The fact that such farm households made up some 20 percent of the total population is significantly symbolic. The limit of the small farming system-plots being too small to achieve economic stability in management-was set at the time of the land reform.
While its significant number (and proportion) of de facto land sales make the case of Namjong-myeon a useful one in tracking the changes in land recipients, it is still too early to generalize these findings. The case of Hojeomyeon, mentioned earlier in this article, clearly shows contrary trends compared to what occurred in Namjong-myeon (Jo 2009a). Of course, the small sample size in the case of Hojeo-myeon makes generalization even harder for that case. Thus, additional research is absolutely necessary in order to compare and generalize these findings. Another limitation to this study is that there was almost no Japanese land ownership in Namjong-myeon. The prior selling of formerly Japanese-owned land, therefore, is not possible to gauge in this study. I hope to later reach broader conclusions by incorporating case studies of other regions.
